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RUNNING HEAD: Municipal Internet Initiative (NOTE: running head needs 
to be less than 50 characters) 
 
ABSTRACT 
Universal high-speed Internet access can productively transform a nation’s economy. However, 
many municipalities in the U.S. have been left behind in terms of Internet penetration. Some 
municipal governments have tried to address this by launching initiatives that aim at offering 
citywide, universal broadband access. Unfortunately, most of these initiatives have either been 
discontinued or have ended in failure. Drawing on actor-network theory, we conducted a 
three-year study to investigate the evolution of the Internet TV initiative in LaGrange, Georgia, 
U.S. The results reveal distinct interpretations of the initiative by different actor groups (the 
government, the service providers, socioeconomically advantaged residents, and 
socioeconomically disadvantaged residents), at different stages of implementation, pointing to 
tensions among the various groups. These tensions reflect the structural problems embedded in 
the macro political, economic, and societal context. The findings offer insights for policymakers 
who intend to achieve universal broadband access. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In theory, the Internet can be made available to everyone, yet in reality it is not (Sy 1999). When 
subject to a market-oriented distribution mechanism in capitalistic economies, it is not equally 
accessible to everyone. Accordingly, some commentators have warned that privatization of the 
telecom industry can further marginalize individuals and areas that are disadvantaged (Sinha 
1991; Sy 1999; Wellenius and Stern 1994). Scholars have therefore argued that governmental 
intervention is needed to ensure universal Internet access (Graham and Marvin 2001; Sy 1999; 
Warschauer 2004). The recent municipal Internet initiatives are efforts in that vein (Hu and 
Reardon 2005; Hudson 2010; Reardon 2005; Tapia and Ortiz 2010).  
 
Municipal Internet initiatives aim to maximize universal access, social inclusion, civic 
engagement, public participation, and economic development (Hudson 2010; Meader, Keil, and 
McFarlan 2001; Tapia and Ortiz 2010; Tapia, Kvasny, and Ortiz 2011). Unfortunately, most of 
these initiatives have faced serious challenges and, as a result, have ended up getting 
terminated (Tapia and Ortiz 2010; Hudson 2010). Prior work points to a variety of reasons why 
such projects fail. For instance, some studies have shown that the initiators and supporters of 
these projects have tended to embrace a naive technological deterministic view, believing that 
objectives ranging from social inclusion to economic development can be attained merely by 
providing low cost or free Internet access to citizens (e.g., Tapia and Ortiz 2010). Additionally, 
some studies have found that universal broadband services have sometimes been mis-targeted 
or deployed in the wrong locations (e.g., Hudson 2010; Tapia et al. 2011). Other work has 
suggested that private Internet service providers have felt threatened by these governmental 
initiatives and have therefore taken legal actions and lobbied actively to block them (Hu and 
Reardon 2005; Hudson 2010).  
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While the prior literature offers some insight into why most of the governmental initiatives have 
failed, additional research is needed to deepen our theoretical understanding of the complex 
array of challenges involved in implementing governmental ICT initiatives (Kvasny 2002; 
Warschauer 2004). Toward this end, some scholars have pointed out that public ICT projects 
usually involve a variety of parties with diverse motivations and interests (Flak and Rose 2005; 
Murray, Golden, and Hughes 2004), while others have noted that the consequences of 
governmental ICT interventions depend on the broader social, political, and economic contexts in 
which the technology is implemented (Castells 2004; Sy 1999). Indeed, many of the difficulties of 
ICT implementation stem from the fact that the technology is embedded in a complex social 
system. Therefore an understanding of collectively-funded ICT initiatives cannot be achieved 
without considering the complex interplay among various stakeholders and the impact of 
contextual factors (Carter, Agarwal, and Sambamurty 1999; Howcroft, Newell, and Wagner 
2004; Johns 2006; Kling and Scacchi 1982; Warschauer 2004). 
 
Unfortunately, few studies have examined the interactions between the various stakeholders, 
how these interactions evolve overtime, and how social, economic, and political factors influence 
the development and outcomes of these initiatives. This lack of research is understandable since 
such investigations require longitudinal studies that allow chronicling of the development of 
governmental ICT interventions, capture the perceptions and responses of important 
stakeholders (government, legislators, citizens, service providers, etc.), and incorporate a rich 
set of contextual factors. For this type of study, actor-network theory (ANT) is a promising 
framework.  
 
We use the actor-network theory lens to investigate the municipal broadband Internet initiative in 
the city of LaGrange, Georgia. The Lagrange Internet TV (LITV) initiative received widespread 
media attention as it was one of the first cases in which a municipal government supplied 
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high-speed household Internet access to all citizens who wanted it (Meader et al. 2001). We 
analyze the case over a three-year period, from its inception through termination.1  
 
Governmental interventions are subject to the influence of the broader social, political, and 
economic contexts in which an ICT is to be implemented (Castells 2004; Musa, Mbarika, and 
Meso 2006; Musa, Meso, and Mbarika 2005; Sy 1999). Hence scholars have emphasized the 
importance of incorporating contextual factors a priori into investigations such as the present one 
in order to generate critical insights into the success or failure of human interventions (Carter et 
al. 1999; Howcroft et al. 2004; Johns 2006). We employ ANT to incorporate contextual factors 
such as political context, economic environment, and societal structure to better understand why 
LITV succeeded for a time but was ultimately terminated. Our objective is to: (1) advance our 
theoretical understanding, through the ANT lens, of the challenges associated with implementing 
universal broadband access policies, and (2) contribute to the knowledgebase needed to guide 
the development of sound ICT policies. 
  
Actor-Network Theory 
In ANT, governmental ICT interventions can be seen as translation processes2 in which the 
interests of various actors are expressed in terms of specific needs (e.g., connect everyone to 
the information superhighway) and are enacted through a social policy (e.g., universal 
                                                 
1
 This paper is the third one from our large-scale research project on LITV. The first evaluated differences in 
post-implementation behavioral models across socioeconomic status (Hsieh, Rai, and Keil 2008). The 
second evaluated how the socioeconomically advantaged (SEA) and the socioeconomically disadvantaged 
(SED) differ in various forms of capital (i.e., cultural, social, and economic capital) that have a bearing on 
ICT use, and how the capital endowments of SEA and SED are relatively impacted by public policy for ICT 
access (Hsieh, Rai, and Keil 2011). These three studies differ in their research questions, theoretical 
foundation, and scope of data used, and contribute to different aspects of our understanding of issues 
related to the provision of universal broadband. 
2
 To increase the durability of these interests and to stabilize the network, translations are 
inscribed in artifacts. Inscription takes place in the interactions among human actors, in the 
formation of a technology, and in the placement of this technology in an actor-network (Latour 
2005). 
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broadband Internet access). During the translation process, the specific needs, scenarios for 
how the technology will be used (programs of action), and the roles to be played by actors are 
inscribed in the artifact. The ultimate success of projects such as LITV rests critically on the 
initiating actors’ ability to manage the diverse interests of other actors in the network, and 
mobilize broader support to ensure that the other actors will comply and fulfill their respective 
roles (Callon 1986; Latour 1996; Law and Hassard 1999).  
 
Translation consists of four major stages: problematization, interessement, enrollment, and 
mobilization (Callon 1986). It should be noted that translation processes might fail at any stage. 
While the translation stages can often be more fluid and interrelated than Callon’s four-stage 
translation model might suggest (Holmström and Robey 2005; Law and Hassard 1999), the four 
translation stages described in Table 1 still provide a useful framework for analyzing an 
actor-network.  
= = = = insert Table 1 about here = = = = 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 Site Selection: LaGrange Internet TV Initiative 
LaGrange, with a population of 27,000, is located 60 miles southwest of Atlanta, Georgia. Its 
socioeconomically disadvantaged residents include a disproportionate number of elderly, 
females, disabled, racial minorities, single-parent families, and the less educated (Hsieh et al. 
2008). This profile reflects that of the U.S. in general and is consistent with those identified in 
many prior digital divide studies (Lam and Lee 2006; Lenhart 2002; NTIA 1998; NTIA 1999; NTIA 
2000; NTIA 2002).  
 
By 1999, city officials, particularly the mayor of LaGrange (Jeff Lukken), had observed the 
tremendous business and economic boom stimulated by the Internet. While metropolitan centers 
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such as Silicon Valley, Research Triangle (NC), and New York City thrived, rural areas in the 
U.S. continued to lag behind in Internet penetration (Graham and Marvin 2001; Townsend 2001). 
Aware of this, the mayor felt the need for digital connectivity to enable the city and its residents to 
take part in the emerging digital economy. He therefore launched an initiative aimed at providing 
free high-speed Internet service to every household in LaGrange.  On the part of the cable TV 
company that partnered with the city government, the envisioned provided an opportunity to 
cable TV service providers to penetrate this rural market, which was likely to have robust 
demand because of poor TV reception.  
 
In April 2000, based on the hybrid co-axial and fiber-based network that was already used to 
provide cable TV and broadband services, city officials devised a three-way contract with the 
cable company (Charter Communications) and an Internet service provider (ISP) (WorldGate 
Communications) to use the surplus bandwidth to provide an Internet TV service to every 
household at no additional cost. The plan was to extend this service by providing customers with 
a free TV-based Internet service through the same set-top box that was used to provide the 
digital cable service. Thereby residents could receive household Internet service without paying 
anything beyond the basic cable fee of $8.70 per month. In those few cases where a household 
wanted to use LITV but could not afford the cable fee, the city was willing to subsidize the cost of 
the basic cable connection. In other words, the city government intended to make LITV a 
universal service such that every resident in the city could access the Internet for free.3 From a 
research perspective, the LITV initiative provided us with a unique opportunity to study a policy 
intervention that was designed specifically to promote universal broadband access. 
 
                                                 
3
 There was obviously a cost associated with providing the service.  This cost was collectively borne by the city 
government, the cable provider, and the Internet service provider. For the remainder of the paper, we use the term 
“free” in describing Lagrange’s Internet initiative because that is the way in which it was characterized and marketed 
by the city and the way in which other actors such as citizens and the media referred to it (e.g., Marcotte 2000; Meader 
et al. 2001).  
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Data Collection 
Following prior ANT research in ICT-related areas (Faraj, Kwon, and Watts 2004; Walsham and 
Sahay 1999), our method was informed by contextualism (Pettigrew 1990; Walsham and 
Waema 1994) and we sought to develop a rich understanding of the LITV project by 
reconstructing the project history, investigating different actor groups’ activities and opinions, and 
examining the social, political, and economic contexts in which those activities and opinions 
occurred and were shaped. We also attempted to uncover the impact of the political, economic, 
and social contexts on actors’ perceptions of the initiative, how different actor groups’ 
perceptions evolved over time, and how their opinions and actions contributed to the outcomes 
of the initiative. A longitudinal design was chosen because it allowed us to gain a comprehensive 
and rich understanding of the context and the associated behavioral consequences (Johns 
2006), and how the actions and perceptions of different actor groups evolved over time 
(Walsham and Sahay 1999).  
 
The archival and primary data were collected over a three-year period from 2001 to 2003. The 
primary data were collected in four phases, as outlined in Table 2. The first phase (2001) 
consisted of 25 interviews with all of the major parties, including city officials, the cable operator, 
and the ISP. The second phase (2002) included seven interviews with city officials and council 
members to obtain their perspectives on the ongoing project. In the third phase a large-scale 
survey (n=900 responses) with open-ended questions was administered to the residents who 
had installed LITV as well as those who had not yet done so by summer 2003. While the 
quantitative results of the survey have been reported elsewhere4, here we draw upon the 
qualitative data provided by 147 residents who responded to the open-ended questions. We also 
conducted 140 telephone interviews to further probe residents’ perceptions of the project. These 
                                                 
4
 The quantitative data were collected based on the positivist lens of technology acceptance theories and 
social capital theories, which are totally different from actor-network theory. The analyses and results of the 
quantitative data appear in Hsieh et al. (2008) and Hsieh et al. (2011). 
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respondents related their experiences and opinions of the technology, the initiative, the service 
providers, and/or the city government. Shortly after the survey and telephone interviews, the 
initiative was discontinued. During the fourth phase in late 2003, the city granted us access to 
conduct interviews (with 28 subjects) in the community center to understand residents’ reactions 
to the termination of the project. All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed.  
= = = = insert Table 2 about here = = = = 
Data Analysis 
We followed the recommended procedures for qualitative research and grounded theory 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Miles and Huberman 1994; Strauss and Corbin 1994). Note that we took the 
grounded theory approach to coding our data, an approach that is commonly used for analyzing 
qualitative data; we did not take the grounded theory approach to theory generation.5 
Specifically, we adopted the “Straussian” approach to grounded theory, which permits 
researchers’ exposure to related literature (ANT in this particular case) to guide the data analysis 
process (Strauss and Corbin 1994). We followed an iterative coding procedure that involved 
identifying the emerging concepts, examining empirical evidence for their support, consolidating 
similar concepts to create more refined ideas, and collecting more data until reaching theoretical 
saturation. Data analysis was based on the three types of coding suggested by Strauss and 
Corbin (1990), i.e., open coding, axial coding, and selective coding. The data analysis process 
was facilitated by using QSR NVivo software, which was designed for managing data complexity 
and supporting qualitative analysis. We first identified 95 codes during the open coding stage, 
with each code supported by two or more text segments. During the axial coding stage, we 
consolidated codes that were conceptually similar. Sample codes and supporting illustrations are 
given in the appendices, which will be discussed in a later section. Finally, during selective 
                                                 
5
 Myers (2009) has indicated that many qualitative researchers in business and management use 
grounded theory as a way of coding their data, while others use it as a method of theory generation. We 
acknowledge such a distinction and, in this research, use the grounded theory approach for data analysis 
and not for theory generation. 
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coding we strived to integrate the identified codes and formulate a storyline that offered a 
coherent and insightful account of the LITV initiative (Boudreau and Robey 2005). Further rounds 
of data collection and coding were performed until theoretical saturation was reached.  
 
The qualitative and longitudinal research approach resulted in a rich dataset that allowed us to 
construct a chronology of the project and relate this to the translation stages of ANT. The 
identification of actors was guided by our reading of the interview transcripts, supplemented by 
public documents (e.g., case studies, newspaper reports, and magazine articles). In addition to 
key human actors, we purposefully viewed LITV as the critical technology actant (i.e., 
non-human actor) and paid particular attention toward its roles and, more importantly, different 
actor groups’ inscriptions into it.  
RESULTS 
The Political, Economic, and Social Context of the Initiative 
Before moving onto the details of each stage of the ANT translation process, we first discuss the 
political, economic, and social aspects of the environment in which the LITV initiative was 
implemented. As noted earlier, these contextual factors may directly or indirectly affect the 
outcomes of such governmental ICT interventions (Carter et al. 1999; Castells 2004; Howcroft et 
al. 2004; Kling and Scacchi 1982; Sy 1999; Warschauer 2004). 
 
Politically, the city of LaGrange follows the typical U.S. democratic model. The city government 
performs the administrative function and is under the supervision of the city council, which 
performs the legislative function. The mayor of LaGrange and the city council members are all 
elected by LaGrange residents. The impact of the government’s public policy initiatives on the 
city’s budget is usually a primary concern of the city council.  
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Like most communities in the U.S., there are notable socioeconomic and racial differences 
between different neighborhoods in LaGrange. The distribution of income and education 
attainment (Jung, Qiu, and Kim 2001; Lenhart 2002), correlates with race in a way that agrees 
with the general pattern of social inequality in the United States (Roscigno and Anisworth-Darnell 
1999). 
 
Problematization: Envisioning a City-Wide Universal High-Speed Internet Service 
 
By providing universal broadband access through the LITV initiative, the mayor hoped to achieve 
the following objectives: (1) bridge the digital divide, (2) enhance workforce development, and (3) 
facilitate economic development. These objectives were interrelated in that bridging the digital 
divide would encourage citizens to develop the digital skills needed in the workplace; and the 
development of a digitally literate workforce would attract employers to the area, making 
LaGrange a more attractive place for investment.  
 
The materialization of this vision required the endorsement of and participation from various 
parties, including the government, the council members, the cable and Internet service providers, 
and the residents to jointly create an actor-network. Hence the mayor collaborated with other city 
government officials to draft a written report in which they inscribed their vision. Based on our 
analysis, we identified several relevant actor groups and their constituents (Table 3). The 
attitudes and actions of the human actors to the LITV initiative at different stages in the 
translation process are summarized in Table 4. 
= = = = insert Table 3 and Table 4 about here = = = = 
Interessement: A Governmental Initiative with a Profit-Making Agenda  
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During the interessement stage, the city government took several actions to interest the cable 
company (Charter), the ISP (WorldGate), and the city council. The city government had already 
contracted with Charter to offer cable modem and digital cable services. Given the intention to 
offer a TV-based Internet service through the same set-top box used for the cable service, 
WorldGate was identified as the only viable Internet service provider that had the capability to 
deliver Internet access over a cable TV-based system. In this sense, while the city government 
was the initiator of the project, Worldgate can be viewed as the technical designer of the LITV 
service. Hal Krisbergh, CEO of WorldGate, and Paul Allen, who had acquired Charter, both 
shared a vision to create a wired society, paralleling the mayor’s aim of providing universal 
access. The CEO of WorldGate said:  
 
We always felt that a major objective of WorldGate as a fundamental business 
strategy was to provide very low cost Internet access, which in effect would bridge 
the digital divide … WorldGate was always very focused on pervasive deployment 
of the service as a solution to bringing the Internet to the “have nots” of the world. 
 
This initiative also required the political and legal endorsement of the city council. While the 
council members agreed that this use of the surplus cable bandwidth would benefit the city and 
its residents; without financial data, council members worried that it would not be cost effective to 
offer free Internet access. As council member Bobby Traylor recalled:  
 
When it was first proposed, I said, “Wow, where are we going to get the money? I 
know it would be beneficial, I know it’s needed if you’re going to bridge this divide. 
But where in the heck [are] we going to get the money?”  
The financing of such public policy initiatives is always a central concern. One major 
contradiction between the free service idea and the service providers’ business models is that 
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both WorldGate and Charter needed to consider the earning potential of this project and were 
accountable to their investors. When asked whether Charter would like to offer the WorldGate 
service for free, CEO of Charter, Jerry Kent laughed, “I don't think my stockholders are going to 
quite go for that.” 
 
Since neither the cable company nor the ISP were interested in giving away something for 
nothing, the initiating actors had to structure the arrangement to offer a reasonable-value 
proposition for all parties concerned. In the cable industry, companies generate substantial 
revenue through the sales of premium services, such as pay-per-view and video-on-demand. As 
digital set-top boxes provide the platform for selling more premium services, Charter was drawn 
into the actor-network by the city’s plan to place a digital set-top box in every LaGrange 
household. The possibility of 100% penetration of the residential market was very attractive to 
Charter because that would greatly increase the number of customers with the ability to 
purchase premium services. WorldGate received $0.40 per click-through from the sponsor of the 
hyperlink that took TV viewers directly to e-commerce website, an innovative feature of the 
Worldgate system. WorldGate’s business model was predicated on generating a significant 
amount of revenue through this feature. Given such a business model, it was in WorldGate’s 
interest to expand its subscriber base and the LITV initiative would help them to do exactly that. 
 
To further garner support, the city government offered to take responsibility for promoting the 
initiative and installing the technology for the cable company. Thus, in the interessement phase, 
the economic benefits to the companies were promoted, and the marketing and installation were 
assumed by the city. The city manager, Tom Hall, was able to interest Charter and WorldGate 
with potential business benefits and convinced them to offer the service at a highly discounted 
rate. The city manager recalled his conversation with the CEO of Charter when the idea to offer 
the service for free was first suggested:   
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We went to Charter and said, “Jerry, you guys want to sell pay-per-view, you guys 
want to sell digital cable, you guys want to sell all this stuff but in order to do it 
you've got to get that box out on people's TV[s] … If we can offer free Internet, the 
city will go out and install it for you, we'll market it for you. And I promise you we're 
going to get some boxes out there on people's TVs and you guys are going to 
have the opportunity to sell your services in greater numbers [than] you would 
otherwise.” He thought about it and called us back and said, “all right let's see if 
we can structure something.”  
 
Thus the LITV initiative was inscribed with distinct interests by the different actor groups. From 
the perspective of the city, the vision of offering high-speed Internet access to every household 
was predicated on the notion that, for the benefit of all LaGrange residents, the Internet should 
be available at no financial cost. From the perspective of the cable provider and the ISP, whose 
value and survival is dependent on their profit-making abilities, the LITV initiative had to be 
conceived as a market-driven action that had the potential to achieve higher revenue, increased 
market share, and higher profit. Specifically, the cable provider saw the Worldgate service in a 
very instrumental way (i.e., as an opportunity to get its set top box in more households and to 
thereby generate additional revenue as residents purchased more cable services).  Worldgate 
(the ISP) inscribed their service not only as a low cost means for residents to access the Internet, 
but also as a tool to bring together marketers and consumers (i.e., through channel hyperlinking) 
in a new way that held the potential to generate revenue for the ISP. 
 
Enrollment 
City Government and Suppliers: A Win-Win Situation 
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During this stage, the government formulated a three-way deal that enrolled the ISP and the 
cable company to jointly offer a largely discounted service to residents of LaGrange. Under this 
agreement, the city government would pay WorldGate the ISP fees, which were reduced from 
the typical range of $4.95 to $16.95 per month down to $0.30 a month per set-top box. The city 
also agreed to reimburse Charter for part of the $6.95 monthly fee Charter would have normally 
collected from customers as payment for use of the digital box. The city prepared a $296,000 
budget to cover the cost for the first 15 months.  
 
Under the agreement, the city organized 15 employees from various city departments, including 
policemen, firemen, water workers, and code inspectors, to install boxes in residents’ homes and 
to provide the necessary training to operate the WorldGate system. In return for each installation, 
Charter reimbursed the city $45. This arrangement imposed very little financial burden on the city 
and addressed the council members’ concern. The council officially endorsed the initiative. Some 
council members considered the city manager to be an excellent deal maker and credited him for 
this three-way contract. Councilman Bobby Traylor recalled: 
With Tom Hall’s initiative … and going to the table with WorldGate and Charter, 
and coming back and saying, “Hey we can do it for this.” No way in the world we 
could have done it any better, and I was saying great … let’s move forward. 
The LITV service became available in June 2000 and cable subscribers could request the 
service for no additional charge. Those who did not subscribe to the cable TV service only 
needed to pay the $8.70/month fee for the basic cable TV service and for those who could not 
afford basic cable the city was willing to pay this fee. The city government promoted LITV 
through direct mail, community centers, the library, newspapers, and radio. By April 2001, about 
35% of the eligible households had opted to enroll for the free service. 
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As one of the first municipalities to offer free high-speed Internet to every eligible household in 
town, the LITV initiative drew considerable media attention and was positively recognized. Both 
Charter and WorldGate perceived this to be a great benefit for their brand names and service 
offerings. The VP of Operations for Charter said, “From a PR standpoint, it’s a huge win for 
everybody all the way round.” The council members also felt that outsiders looked at the city as 
being innovative, progressive and forward thinking, which infused a positive energy into the 
council and the city government. The city manager observed: 
We recently were named the finalist in the “Innovations in American Government 
Program” … I think we’ve been on CNN four times. Did I think the president of 
IBM Japan was going to come to talk to me about how we structured our business 
relationships? The most intelligent city in the world [award]. We actually, I mean 
competing cities for that award included the cities of New York, Chicago, Toronto, 
London and Rio. That’s pretty tall company for LaGrange, Georgia.  
 
Residents: Tensions between the Disadvantaged, the Advantaged, and the Government 
Despite the efforts of the city government and business partners, a significant portion of the 
population had not yet chosen to install LITV by the spring of 2001. While there were numerous 
reasons for their hesitance for adopting LITV, one major discriminating factor was socioeconomic 
status. This is consistent with prior findings that income and education—which are indicative of 
one’s socioeconomic status—are the two most important predictors for ICT use and nonuse 
(Lenhart 2002; Mbarika, Musa, and McMullen 2002; Musa et al. 2006; NTIA 1998; NTIA 1999). 
Life-factors, such as educational attainment, income level, state of health, employment status, 
and feelings of control and confidence, usually correlate with one another and tend to be lower 
for the socioeconomically disadvantaged (Borstein and Bradley 2003; Henry 2004; Lam and Lee 
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2006; Musa et al. 2006; Musa et al. 2005). The discrepancies in the above life-factors between 
the socioeconomically disadvantaged and advantaged not only affect their life-opportunities and 
living conditions, but also shape their different worldviews and ways of interpreting surrounding 
events (Williams 1990).  
 
LaGrange residents’ socioeconomic status was a key influence on their differing interpretations 
of the initiative, in terms of who stood to benefit most from LITV and how much should be paid for 
access. These interpretations mirrored their distinct identities, interests, and positions in society, 
e.g., whether they were socioeconomically disadvantaged or advantaged, and whether or not 
they were part of an ethnic minority. In particular the socioeconomically disadvantaged tended to 
emphasize that their survival needs assumed a higher priority than use of the Internet. They also 
indicated that they were unable to take advantage of the technology due to a lack of requisite 
resources such as disposable time, physical ability, or even a place to live (see Appendix A for 
identified codes and illustrations). Some thus criticized the government for providing Internet 
access rather than taking care of more pressing needs. The above interpretations all highlight 
the inadequate resource conditions that constantly trouble the disadvantaged.  
 
Among the socioeconomically advantaged who had not yet adopted LITV, there were some who 
felt strongly about the project and expressed views that were tightly coupled with assumptions 
about class and race. In particular some complained that the free Internet service was a waste of 
taxpayers’ money and that the poor should not be subsidized. For instance, an advantaged 
individual commented, “I think if the poor want to use the Internet, they should do like I have had 
to do in the past when I couldn’t afford to pay for Internet—go to the library.” Those who already 
subscribed to Charter’s cable TV service felt it was unfair that others were getting cable service 
for free (see Appendix A for illustrations). Some of these statements were raised in a very 
strongly-worded fashion. One of the persons interviewed asked, “When did Hispanic or Latino 
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become the majority in the U.S.?”, suggesting that the free LITV project was faced with a deeply 
rooted problem of this heterogeneous society—namely, tensions between racial and ethnic 
groups. Given the notorious history of racial prejudice in the U.S. (Brown, Williams, Jackson, 
Neighbors, Torres, Sellers, and Brown 2000), race played an undeniable role in how the LITV 
initiative was interpreted, leading some white residents to conclude that they were subsidizing 
free Internet access for blacks. Quotes from a white middle-aged male frankly revealed his 
opinion in this regard and illustrated how long-lasting racial prejudice influenced some of the 
white residents’ attitudes toward the project. For example:  
 
[M]y mom, they have to pay about 80 something bucks a month. It is cable TV and the 
Internet, the high-speed. They complained about it that all these black people can 
have it for free, and they have to pay to do what they want to do on the Internet. They 
are old, they are a bit racist, a little prejudice to the minority. I heard other [white] 
people complained about that WorldGate stuff, they give it to the blacks, all of a 
sudden. The whites need to pay to use that kind of stuff.  
 
There were salient attitudinal differences between the disadvantaged and the advantaged who 
had not installed the technology. While the disadvantaged tended to speak of their life difficulties, 
the advantaged revealed their self-image as the dominating class that felt ripped off by the 
subsidies provided to the poor and the racial minorities. This sharp contrast in terms of the two 
groups’ interpretations reflect the underlying tensions (and power relations) between the 
privileged and the underprivileged in U.S. society (Castells 1997; Castells 2004). Since the 
residents’ voices could influence the policymakers and thereby the continuance or 
discontinuance of the initiative, these tensions had the potential to compromise the stability of the 
actor-network. 
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There were voices from both groups questioning the mayor and the city government’s real 
motivations behind the free initiative, which suggested a lack of trust in the government and its 
effort to provide free technology. Some residents suspected that the government was trying to 
use LITV as a surveillance device to monitor their behaviors, while others doubted that the 
service would remain free and were convinced that the government planned to reap some 
financial gains out of the service. Council member Nick Wooden concluded, “So you can’t give 
me anything free, if you give me something free, it must be part of a government scheme.” This 
distrustful attitude could have posed a threat to the legitimacy of the government’s effort.  
 
During the enrollment stage, there were both favorable and unfavorable attitudes and actions 
from different actor groups (i.e., the government, the service providers, residents who had or had 
not yet subscribed to the service, and the media). These attitudes and actions can be understood 
by examining the actors’ standpoints within the social system. The enrollment of the business 
partners (i.e., WorldGate and Charter), who operated in a capitalistic system, was primarily 
motivated by the potential for market penetration, revenue growth, and profit. The council 
members’ concerns reflected the demands for legitimacy and financial feasibility of governmental 
operations in the U.S political context. Finally, opinions from the socioeconomically 
disadvantaged and advantaged reflected their relative positions in society.  
 
Mobilization 
While the interessement stage is oriented towards convincing actors to enroll in the network, 
accept their roles, and hopefully become an active part of the initiative, the focus of the 
mobilization stage is on securing continued support from the enrolled actors, thereby stabilizing 
the network and institutionalizing its underlying ideas. In the case of LITV, as reported below, we 
observed polarized opinions from the advantaged and disadvantaged actors who had personally 
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used LITV, as well as council members’ concerns about the legitimacy and financial 
sustainability of LITV, suggesting a fragile actor-network. 
 
Actant: LITV 
LITV is the focal technology, or the actant, in this initiative. As discussed earlier, different actor 
groups (i.e., the government, the ISP, the cable TV service provider, and the residents) had 
inscribed very different meanings into the actant during the problematization, interessement, and 
enrollment stages. Inscriptions made at these stages were typically based on actors’ impressions 
of the initiative rather than on actual use of the technology. However, once things progressed to 
the mobilization stage, in which adopters began to have first-hand interaction with (or use of) the 
technology, the role of the technical features of LITV became quite important in shaping 
residents’ responses to the initiative. As Orlikowski and Lacono (2001) note, instead of treating 
the technology as a black box, it is important to examine its technical features. 
 
Specifically, the LITV initiative used a television-based Internet access device. Subscribers 
received a free wireless keyboard and digital set-top box, which connected the TV to the cable 
network. With the wireless keyboard, users could browse the Internet via their TV. At the rate of 
158 kbps, the connection speed was nearly three times higher than the typical dial-up service 
(56 kbps), but still significantly lower than normal cable modem speeds. Subscribers also 
enjoyed unlimited access, a free email service, 5 MB of web space, and a technical support 
hotline that was available seven days a week. Training was available in the community center, 
over cable TV, and through a technical support hotline. Users did not have to install or maintain 
an operating system or application programs. However, the system did not allow the printing or 
storage of files, or browsing of websites that required software plug-ins (such as Adobe Acrobat 
and Apple QuickTime). Also, users could not browse the Internet and watch TV simultaneously. 
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These technical features were subject to different interpretations by the different actor groups. 
While LITV was more limited in its capability than a personal computer, the technology was 
easier to operate and maintain because of its thin client architecture. This simplicity in terms of 
technical design and functionality meant that fewer financial resources were required for 
installation and upkeep. For the government, LITV represented a viable solution for reaching 
those who otherwise could not afford high-speed household Internet access and explore all that 
it has to offer. For the enrolled participants, however, the nature of this technology elicited quite 
different reactions from the socioeconomically advantaged compared to the socioeconomically 
disadvantaged.  
Residents  
After directly interacting with the technology, the socioeconomically advantaged and 
disadvantaged groups developed polarized views towards the initiative. The disadvantaged 
users tended to express high satisfaction with LITV. The ability to surf the Internet infused them 
with a sense of digital participation. One female resident with only elementary school education 
expressed her joyfulness, “And then I realized, ‘hey, I can go on the Internet’ (laughed quite 
happily).” The disadvantaged also perceived economic, educational, social, and health benefits 
derived from using the service (see Appendix B for identified codes and illustrations). There was 
evidence that students in low-income families used LITV for class and learning purposes. Some 
of the disadvantaged users without any prior computer experience could apply the acquired 
digital skills in their current job tasks. In addition, some of the disadvantaged were disabled 
and/or suffering from chronic diseases. There was evidence suggesting that they were able to 
use the Internet to search for health-related information and knowledge that helped to maintain 
or improve their physical or mental conditions. Some of them suffered from mental problems and 
were able to obtain social support to improve their situation. Tom Gore, one of the council 
members who was also a medical doctor, described one such example: 
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I have one real glory story from one of my patients, she was financially strapped, 
did not have any income. She was using this and, actually for her, it brought her 
out of depression. Because she was very depressed, and she was able to make 
human contact with people all over the world. And she had friends she would 
correspond with in India and other countries. It [Internet TV] was the thing [that] 
brought her out of the medical depression. 
It was also common among the disadvantaged to have a feeling that the technology would 
benefit “everyone”, or everyone should have the service. A retired senior resident living with his 
spouse shared his opinions:  
The Internet TV is very important to me. I find it most useful and helpful. My wife 
and I are the only ones at this address. I am the only one who actively operates 
the equipment. However, it is not unusual for her to ask me to use the equipment 
for some purpose she has in mind, so both of us profit from it. I think the city did a 
great deed when they decided to furnish this service. And I hope they will continue 
to do so. I think the Internet is easy to use and I think everyone should use it. I 
intend to use it myself as long as I am able.  
By contrast, the socioeconomically advantaged users, given their prior computer experience and 
ownership of better technologies that reflect their superior socioeconomic status, often viewed 
LITV as inferior to a PC with a broadband connection (see Appendix B for illustrations). They 
tended to judge the value of LITV based on their prior knowledge about personal computers. For 
instance, they devalued LITV because it did not come with typical PC peripherals such as a CD 
drive, printer, or scanner. Some complained about the poor display of Internet content on a TV 
screen. With her professional web design background, a female with a doctoral degree was able 
to point out that this problem was due to the mismatch between TV screen resolution and 
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webpage design.6 The view of the advantaged that LITV was an inferior technology was perhaps 
best captured by the comment offered by one advantaged user, “LITV is a real Mickey Mouse 
way of going to the Internet”. Moreover, there were voices raised against the project from some 
advantaged users that it was informed by good intentions, but lacking in execution. In particular, 
some of the advantaged users developed a perception that the LITV initiative missed a large 
fraction of the target audience—namely, the socioeconomically disadvantaged—while others 
found it slow and tedious, and limited in terms of its functionality. 
 
City Government and Suppliers: Mixed Signals for Actor-Network Stability 
Two years after the implementation, council members heard various positive and negative 
accounts. On the positive side, council members heard stories that encouraged them to continue 
supporting the LITV initiative. As Council member Tom Gore indicated, “I do have a lot of people 
saying they like it [and] appreciated it.” Council member George Moore recalled, “I’ve run across 
a few that have not used it, but those who are using it are really happy and pleased with it.” On 
the negative side, council members received feedback from residents criticizing LITV as a waste 
of taxpayers’ money and asking for its termination, thus questioning the legitimacy of the 
initiative. 
 
In addition to the issue of legitimacy, the ongoing financial viability of the initiative surfaced as 
another challenge to the stability of the actor-network. Specifically, support among the council 
wavered after the burst of the dot-com bubble in early 2002. During this period, conditions in the 
wider economic environment shifted unfavorably for both private and public organizations. As a 
result, the annual budget of the city decreased. The city government was also subject to tighter 
budget control and had to provide stronger justification for expenditures. In response, some 
                                                 
6
 At the time of data collection, the typical TV resolution was 640*480 pixels, whereas webpages were 
usually designed to be displayed as 800*600 pixels.  
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members said that the council should have a harder look at the project.  
 
In August 2002, the first and third authors personally observed the council meeting. During the 
meeting, concerns were raised by council members about the cost and number of people using 
LITV. Facing these concerns, the mayor and the city manager strived to persuade the council 
members. The city manager, Tom Hall, reported that the city was able to negotiate with Charter 
and WorldGate to keep the deal intact for another year for an additional $170,000. In addition, 
based on their analysis of usage data provided by the ISP, he informed the council that the 
highest gain in technology proficiency was identified among socioeconomically disadvantaged 
families, the average household usage was a little over seven hours a week, and those who liked 
and used LITV most were those who had no PC or cable modem at home. Thus, 
socioeconomically disadvantaged households became important actors used to legitimize the 
continuation of the project. 
 
Hall also emphasized that $170,000 would represent only a small fraction of the city’s $7 million 
annual budget. Many council members, however, did not think $170,000 was a small amount. In 
addressing their concerns, the mayor thanked the city manager for negotiating the deal and 
offered further personal observations of LaGrange residents who had successfully used LITV. By 
the end of this meeting, the council voted for continuation of the project, holding the network 
together for another year.  
 
Project Termination and Aftermath 
There were many factors threatening the stability of the actor-network including the 
dissatisfaction of many socioeconomically advantaged households, criticism from some 
advantaged citizens that this was not a legitimate use of taxpayer money, and distrust from some 
citizens regarding the government’s intentions. Moreover, by the end of 2002, two years into the 
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LITV implementation, neither the cable company nor the ISP had realized the expected profit, 
which was one of the main reasons they had originally signed up to the initiative. This was 
understandable since the advantaged, who had more disposable income for buying premium 
services like pay-per-view and video-on-demand, were not the primary users of LITV. 
 
What ultimately broke the actor-network was that by 2003 WorldGate was running out of cash 
and facing the prospect of bankruptcy.7 Consequently, WorldGate was forced to inform the city 
government about their financial uncertainty and that the Internet service might be terminated at 
any time. The project was eventually terminated in late 2003 due to the inability of WorldGate to 
continue offering the Internet service and the city government’s inability to find an alternative ISP.  
 
The breakdown of the network was especially hard for the socioeconomically disadvantaged who 
had embraced the technology. During the last round of interviews that occurred immediately 
before the project ended, many of these individuals expressed their confusion and frustration at 
the termination. Mary, a high-school-educated middle-aged black female put it this way: 
I hate it when they got the thing down. I hate it because I got so accustomed to it, 
it was easy to log on, when the service is up, I can search much faster. I would sit 
back here and search the web rather than watch the TV. I guess I was kind of 
frustrated. Then I understand the funding was gone, that was it. You got some 
people that can’t leave home, that is the only way they can pay bills online and get 
in touch with the world. 
 
Although some disadvantaged residents had acquired skills and developed quite positive 
                                                 
7
 Ultimately, WorldGate was forced to abandon the ISP business and redefine itself in order to remain 
viable. They are now marketing personal videophones. 
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attitudes toward digital technologies in general, cost remained a barrier to acquiring an Internet 
PC. There was a sentiment of desperation among some of these disadvantaged users, which 
reflected their passive position in the entire initiative, their inability to control or reverse the 
situation, and their helplessness in the social system. A white male with high school education 
described his experience, “It came as a gift and they took it away the same way.” At the end of 
interview, he asked the first author in a quite gloomy tone, “You are going to see us back on that 
Internet TV, right?” A female middle-aged resident who lived in a low-income neighborhood and 
used Internet TV almost on a daily basis pleaded to the first author during an interview in her 
home, “Please don’t take it away. I cannot live without it.”  
CONCLUSION 
This research represents a significant contribution to the literature on public ICT policy, as it is 
one of the first longitudinal studies that applys actor-network theory to gain insights into the 
implementation of a public policy aimed at providing universal broadband Internet access. It is 
also a response to the call for research into critical public policy issues (Lytras 2005; Rynes and 
Shapiro 2005), including policies directed at achieving universal Internet access and bridging the 
digital divide (DiMaggio, Hargittai, Celeste, and Shafer 2004). ANT offered us a systematic 
framework to: (1) comprehend the dynamics of the policy implementation process, (2) identify 
actions and attitudes of different actor groups, and (3) understand how opinions and activities of 
one actor group complement or compete with those of others, thereby supporting or 
compromising the stability of the actor-network. More importantly, our explicit consideration and 
inclusion of contextual factors (i.e., social, political, and economic factors) complements ANT 
and plays a critical role in developing a deeper and more holistic understanding of the 
phenomenon of interest (Carter et al. 1999; Howcroft et al. 2004; Johns 2006). 
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This study contributes to our understanding of why most public universal Internet initiatives have 
been plagued with difficulties in the U.S. While prior studies have suggested reasons ranging 
from simplistic views about technology and society to resistance from telecom corporations (e.g., 
Hudson 2010; Tapia and Ortiz 2010; Tapia et al. 2011), our findings suggest that the answer lies 
in the delicate translation processes through which the interests of various actors are negotiated, 
and importantly, how the external macro contexts affect the evolvement of the translation 
processes through different stages. Specifically, through our analyses, we have shown that the 
demise of the LITV project was due to the translation processes coming to a halt. In the first 
stage, the initiators inscribe in the artifact certain actor-values depending on the initiators’ desired 
outcomes and their perceptions of the profiles of the anticipated actors. In other words, there are 
explicit and/or implicit assumptions and expectations about different actors (Akrich 1992; Akrich 
and Latour 1992). Thus, from the initiators’ point of view, the technology is open to only certain 
types of interactions from particular actor groups. However, the translations involve different 
actor groups at different stages of the process. It is evident in the present case that LITV was 
inscribed very differently by various actor groups. While some of the inscriptions favored the 
creation and continuance of the actor-network, other inscriptions, typically those unforeseen by 
the initiators, compromised the actor-network.  
 
From the perspective of ANT, the inscriptions that different actor groups applied to the 
technology demonstrate a variety of tensions among actor groups that threatened the stability of 
the actor-network. First, there were conflicts between the government’s free universal service 
objective and the service providers’ profit-making agenda. For the mayor, the city manager, and 
the city council, providing universal Internet access for free would bridge the digital divide, 
facilitate workforce development, and stimulate economic growth. Although the service 
providers, WorldGate and Charter, also had a vision of pervasive network access, they also 
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inscribed the initiative with market-growth and profit-making potential. LITV was, therefore, an 
initiative with two competing goals.  
 
In addition, there were tensions between the government and the residents. During the enrollment 
stage, for some socioeconomically disadvantaged residents who had not yet subscribed to the 
service, LITV was viewed as a service with low priority or as a good technology that could not be 
utilized because of other life difficulties or inadequate resource conditions. The advantaged 
sections of the population who had not adopted the technology criticized the initiative as a waste 
of time and money and some saw it as an unfair use of taxpayers’ money. Further, some 
individuals from both groups suspected that LITV was a tool for monitoring their activities or for 
other hidden schemes. 
 
There were also salient conflicts between the socioeconomically disadvantaged and the 
advantaged that took on racial overtones. In particular, many advantaged residents believed they 
were deprived since they had to subsidize LITV for racial and ethnic minorities, socioeconomically 
disadvantaged families, and others to whom they believed themselves to be superior. For 
advantaged users, especially those who had more sophisticated computer knowledge and 
experience, the technical and symbolic inferiority of LITV, compared to an Internet PC, led them to 
conclude that LITV was a misguided initiative that only served the interests of inferior groups of 
people. 
 
While the LITV service was intended to be “free”, it was not really free for many actor groups. 
Although the technology was nominally made free for individual residents, the disadvantaged, 
relative to the advantaged, still face higher marginal financial cost (e.g., basic cable TV charge) 
and non-financial cost (e.g., knowledge, skills, opportunities, and social support) to make 
adequate use of the technology. In this vein, digital inequality is essentially a reflection of deeper 
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social inequalities (e.g., income and education) that have been well documented for decades (e.g. 
Roscigno and Anisworth-Doarnell 1999). Unfortunately, disparities in these dimensions are 
getting worse in most capitalistic market-based economies like the U.S. (Fleming 2011), making it 
increasingly difficult to address the issue of digital inequality in a meaningful way. There was also 
clear evidence that some members of the dominating groups (i.e., the socioeconomically 
advantaged and the racial and ethnic majorities) intended to exclude the dominated groups (i.e. 
the socioeconomically disadvantaged and the racial and ethnic minorities) from participating in 
the digital world, making it difficult to treat LITV as a universal service in the social system. 
Moreover, while the LITV initiative was constructed as a free service, there was cost for the 
government, the cable company, and the Internet service providers. LITV was also a business 
proposition to industry partners; these two competing goals, free service versus profit-making, 
proved to be difficult to reconcile, and resulted in the demise of the actor-network.  
 
Calls have been made for ICT researchers to include both micro and macro dimensions in our 
studies by extending ANT to include issues pertaining to social structures (Rose, Jones, and 
Trues 2005). By incorporating agencies both on the micro and macro levels we explored the ways 
in which the LITV project was shaped over time and how the generative links between micro and 
macro levels played a key part. The LITV project involved the creation of sociotechnical realities, 
but was also shaped by the enduring social structures. Clearly, the process of translation by 
which the will of one actor is transferred to another actor becomes more difficult as more actors 
are brought into the network, because each additional actor is already part of other networks that 
might have aligned them to different and competing goals. To understand the actors’ identities 
and interests it is necessary to consider the environment in which their everyday activities were 
performed prior to participating in the current network. Consideration of the broader political, 
economic, and societal contexts and the various actors’ positions within these arenas allowed us 
to understand the rationales behind their interpretations (Carter et al. 1999; Howcroft et al. 2004; 
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Johns 2006). In this study, the political context (i.e., the democratic process and the requirement 
for legitimacy), the capitalistic economic environment, and the societal structure characterized by 
socioeconomic and racial inequalities and individualism, which puts self-interest above collective 
welfare, played a significant role in shaping the translation and inscription processes. Our findings 
therefore provide concrete empirical illustrations that the implementation and consequences of 
governmental ICT interventions, particularly public policies that intend to make Internet access as 
available to everyone at the lowest possible cost or even for free, are contingent upon the 
influence of political, economic, and social contexts.  
 
The process of constructing the LITV initiative was not purely local; it resulted from local 
decisions made within the broader context. In reflecting on the ways in which the political context, 
economic environment, and societal structure may have constrained or enabled local actions 
and influenced their outcomes, our analysis used ANT to situate the local within the macro 
(Klecun 2004). We agree with Truex, Holmström, and Keil (2006) that ICT scholars can 
contribute not only to cumulative theory in ICT but also to cumulative theory in the field from 
which their theoretical tools are borrowed. A unique and important contribution of this study to the 
ANT literature is our incorporation of macro factors (i.e., the political context, economic 
environment, and societal structure) into ANT analysis. In particular, this study contributes to the 
ANT literature by addressing two criticisms that have been leveled against ANT: (1) that ANT has 
a “flat ontology” that refuses to assign a priori attribution of macro structures in the analysis of the 
interest, needs and actions of actants (Montiero 2000), and (2) that ANT is apolitical in its failure 
to take into account that there may be power relations that affect technological change beyond 
those revealed by studying the immediate needs, interests, and actions of only those actors 
enrolled in the network (Feenberg 1991). 
 
Moreover, from the perspective of ANT, a particular technology itself has no inertia but is moved 
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actively by each social actor with whom it comes in contact. At the beginning of the present 
project these translations failed to work smoothly, and the enrollment of heterogeneous elements 
into the actor-network was fragile and contested (e.g., conflicts between the ideal of a free 
service and the profit-making agenda, tensions between the socioeconomically disadvantaged 
and advantaged). As actors were ultimately unfaithful to their assigned roles (Hanseth and Braa 
1998) (e.g., less-than-universal enrollment, criticism of the government and the initiative, and 
service termination), network stability could not be taken for granted (see Callon 1986; Latour 
1996; Law and Callon 1992). In the case of LITV, when the service served the interests of a 
particular actor group, it underwent a sequence of translations that depended on the group’s 
perception of its possible use and outcomes. Nevertheless, the beneficiaries seldom 
encompassed all actor groups. In other words, not all actor groups involved in this project could 
realize the promised/touted benefits, thus making the network fragile and causing it to eventually 
fall apart. Unfortunately, no efforts were made by either the city government or the service 
providers to effectively address this issue and the processes of translation came to a halt. The 
medium, the LITV, lost its meaning as it failed to serve as a valuable instrument for those who 
were knowledgeable or had access to more advanced ICT and for business partners who 
needed profit for survival. But while the medium lost its meaning, the overall translation 
processes—and the whole notion of universal access—should have been an ongoing endeavor 
with a constant search for an alternative solution that would allow others to be enrolled in the 
actor-network without losing those who had already embraced LITV. Unfortunately, there was no 
search for any alternative solution to rescue and sustain the actor-network. Toward this end, the 
current study contributes to the ANT literature by demonstrating how a technological 
infrastructure relates to the translation, or lack thereof. This research empirically illustrates how 
ideas are inscribed into technology, and how such inscriptions shape the translation trajectory. 
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Table 1: The Four Stages of Translation in ANT 
Translation Stage Description 
Problematization During the problematization stage, the initiating actors define the problem 
to be solved, as well as the identities and interests of other actors that are 
consistent with the interests of the initiating actors. Initiating actors may 
also position themselves as an indispensable resource in the solution of 
the problems that they have defined, and in doing so establish themselves 
as an “obligatory passage point” (Callon 1986) between the other actors 
and the network. 
Interessement 
 
In interessement, initiators attempt to lock allies into place by negotiating 
the terms of their involvement, and by using incentives to engage entities 
not yet involved in the network. Interessement, therefore, involves 
convincing other actors that the interests defined by the initiators are in 
line with their own interests. Callon posits that successful interessement 
“confirms (more or less completely) the validity of the problematization and 
the alliances it implies” (Callon 1986, pp 209-10). 
Enrollment When actors’ accept the roles defined during interessement, the actors are 
enrolled in the network. However, this acceptance is not easily obtained 
because actors do not simply yield to the will of the initiating actors. During 
enrollment, negotiations, trials of strengths, tricks and other strategies are 
used to convince actors to not only accept their roles but also to embrace 
the underlying ideas of the growing actor-network and to become an active 
part of the whole project. 
Mobilization In the final stage of translation, mobilization, initiators try to ensure that 
allied spokespersons act according to the agreement and do not betray 
the initiators’ interests. Building on the network of enrolled actors, initiators 
seek to secure continued support of the underlying ideas from the enrolled 
actors. With allies mobilized, an actor-network achieves stability. This 
stability implies that the actor-network and its underlying ideas have 
become institutionalized and are no longer seen as controversial. 
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Table 2: Scope of the Case Study 
Archival 
data 
News from the local, state, and national media (radio, TV, newspaper, 
magazines, etc.) and case studies 
Reports from academic research institutes 
Primary  
data 
Number of Respondents Respondents 
Phase 1 25 Interviews LaGrange City Officials 
Charter Communications (Cable TV 
operator) 
WorldGate (Internet Service Provider) 
LaGrange Residents Phase 2 7 Interviews r  Council Members 
LaGrange City Officials 
Phase 3 147 Qualitative Response 
140 Phone Interviews 
LaGrange Residents 
LaGrange Residents 
Phase 4 28 Interviews LaGrange Residents 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Actor Groups and Constituents 
Actor Group Constituents  
City Government 
City Mayor  
City Manager 
City Council 
Service Providers 
Cable TV Operator (Charter Communication) 
Internet Service Provider (WorldGate Communication) 
Residents* 
Socioeconomically disadvantaged (SED) residents 
Socioeconomically advantaged (SEA) residents 
The Media Newspapers, magazines, TV and radio stations 
Actant LITV 
* We differentiate between SED and SEA residents because the initiative was targeted at SED 
households that would otherwise not have had Internet access. Following the approach by 
Hsieh et al. (2008 & 2011), we used cluster analysis with income and education as 
discriminants to classify residents into SEA and SED groups. 
 
  Actant: LITV 
Table 4: Attitudes and Actions of Actors to the LITV initiative at Different Translation Stages 
Actor Group 
Stage 
Mayor City  
Officers 
Council  
Members 
Service  
Providers 
The Media SED Residents  SEA Residents 
Problematization - envision a 
universal 
broadband 
service that can 
achieve multiple 
benefits for 
LaGrange  
      
Interessement - promote the 
plan 
 
- identify 
potential service 
providers 
- promote the 
idea to the 
council and 
service providers 
- share the 
universal 
access vision 
- concern for 
financial 
resources 
- share the 
vision to create 
a wired society 
- hope for 
potential market 
and profit 
   
Enrollment - promote the 
plan 
 
- structure the 
deal 
- promote the 
plan 
- help with 
installation 
- offer training 
- endorse the 
plan 
- promote the 
plan 
- participate 
- provide 
service 
 
- wide coverage 
- good 
recognition 
- promote the 
plan 
comments from 
non-participants: 
- survival first 
- constraint in other 
resources 
- distrust in the govt. 
comments from 
non-participants: 
- waste of tax money 
- unfair subsidy 
 
Mobilization - promote the 
plan 
 
- promote the 
plan 
- identify financial 
resources 
- concern for 
financial 
resources 
- financial 
pressure 
- intend to 
charge for 
service 
 comments from 
participants: 
- LITV is for 
everyone 
comments from 
participants: 
- inferior 
technology 
- bad execution 
Post-Termination    - bankrupt 
- terminate 
service 
 comments from 
participants: 
- I can’t live without it 
- please bring it back 
 
APPENDIX A: Examples of attitudes of residents who had not yet installed LITV 
Actor Group Concepts 
(codes) 
Data Source Quotation, Opinions, or Observations 
The socio- 
economically 
disadvantaged 
・survival first  A middle-aged 
African American 
male in a 
low-income area 
“I don’t know why the Mayor instituted this 
initiative. I don’t believe what he says. Utility 
bill reductions help poor people more than 
free Internet. No lights, no Internet. No 
healthcare, no need for Internet ... Internet 
may be good, but survival is what’s 
important, not some computer games for 
people who have credit cards. What — to spy 
on movie stars, or buy junk they can’t afford 
or [don’t] need?”   
The socio- 
economically 
disadvantaged 
・survival first 
 
Personal 
observation by 
the first author 
This was a middle-aged white female I 
encountered in front of the LaGrange 
community library. I asked her if she had 
heard about the Internet TV project. She 
responded that she heard of the project, and 
she thought it would be very good and useful 
to have that in her life. But the difficulty she 
faced was that she had some financial 
problems and did not even have a place to 
live. She literally lived in her car. (She 
showed me the car and a lot of stuff she 
carried to support her basic life). Meanwhile, 
she was in a very bad physical condition and 
had a lot of medical problems. Using Internet 
TV was logistically impossible given her 
situation, although she was aware of and 
interested in the project. 
The socio- 
economically 
disadvantaged 
・survival first 
・lack of 
complementary 
resources 
A white 
middle-aged 
single mother with 
three children 
“I am divorced and I have to take care of 
these three children. I know the Internet can 
be good, but I have to work three jobs now to 
support the family. I still think it would be very 
good. When I have more time, maybe I will 
look into the TV Internet thing.” 
The socio- 
economically 
disadvantaged 
・lack of 
complementary 
resources 
An African 
American female 
in her 40’s in a 
low-income area 
“I thought it would be good. I got diabetes 
and that causes my eye problem. I cannot 
see! If I could see, I would like to use that TV 
Internet. But I don’t see! I have no knowledge 
about computers or Internet.” 
The socio- 
economically 
disadvantaged 
・motivation  
questioned *  
 
Quotes from 
council member 
Nick Wooden 
about residents in 
the public housing 
project  
“Yeah, this is strange… they thought we [the 
government] were spying on them. I mean 
that sounds funny, but they really do think 
that you are spying on them, and you know I 
guess in a way it’s probably possible even 
though I know we’re not doing that. But, you 
know, they don’t trust us. So you can’t give 
me anything free, if you give me something 
free, it must be part of a government 
scheme.” 
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The socio- 
economically 
disadvantaged 
・motivation  
questioned * 
Quotes from the 
city manager 
discussing 
opinions of 
residents in public 
housing project 
“A number of folks were concerned that ‘I 
don’t know about this box you’re putting in my 
house, you’re going to be watching me’… 
‘Alright, what’s the deal? You’re putting this 
box in my house that’s going to use a lot of 
electricity, so my electricity bill goes up, and 
you guys cash out’”.  
The socio- 
economically 
advantaged 
・waste of 
taxpayers’ 
money 
A middle-aged 
socioeconomically 
advantaged White 
male 
“The people I know who have it are very low 
income families who cannot afford anything 
else. They have no computer knowledge and 
no Internet knowledge at all. I personally 
think it is a waste of our money.” 
The socio- 
economically 
advantaged 
・waste of 
taxpayers’ 
money 
Quotes from 
council member 
Nick Wooden 
“The people say we wasting taxpayers 
money. That’s always what you got. You got 
some people if you gave them all the gold 
apples there they would want to, they would 
want some people not to have it and there’s 
just some people you’re never gonna please 
and they is that’s the downside.”   
 
The socio- 
economically 
advantaged 
・don’t use it if 
can’t afford it 
A white male with 
a postgraduate 
degree in his 30’s 
“I think if the poor want to use the Internet, 
they should do like I have had to do in the 
past when I couldn’t afford to pay for Internet 
— go to the library.”  
The socio- 
economically 
advantaged 
・unfair use of  
taxpayers’ 
money 
A socio- 
economically 
advantaged white 
male in his 30’s 
“I hope [the] government is not actually 
paying Charter for this service. If Charter 
says they are providing it free, I would ask 
back the $52 monthly cable bill which is way 
too high. Charter has a monopoly power.” 
The socio- 
economically 
advantaged 
・racial 
prejudice 
A white male in 
his 40’s  
“… my mom, they have to pay about 80 
something bucks a month. It is cable TV and 
the Internet, the high-speed. They 
complained about it that all these black 
people can have it for free, and they have to 
pay to do what they want to do on the Internet 
… I heard other people complained about 
that WorldGate stuff, they give it to the 
blacks, all of a sudden. The whites need to 
pay to use that kind of stuff.”  
The socio- 
economically 
advantaged 
・motivation  
questioned * 
A white female 
with a 
postgraduate 
degree at her 40’s 
“Guess I never could shake the feeling that 
there would be some gimmick attached.”  
* The socioeconomically disadvantaged and advantaged shared this attitude. 
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APPENDIX B: Examples of attitudes of residents who had used LITV 
Actor Group Concepts 
(codes) 
Data Source Quotation, Opinions, or Observations 
The socio- 
economically 
disadvantaged 
 Quotes from 
council member 
Tom Gore, also 
a medical 
doctor 
“I have one real glory story from one of my 
patients, she was financially strapped, didn’t 
have any income. She was using this and 
actually for her, it brought her out of depression. 
Because she was very depressed, and she was 
able to make human contact with people all 
around the world. And she had friends she 
would correspond with in India and other 
countries. It [Internet TV] was the thing [that] 
brought her out of the medical depression. So 
that’s one example, that’s just one person. But 
you hear [a] story like that, you think there must 
be more… I do have a lot of people saying they 
like it, appreciated it. In fact, we will give it to 
them free, elderly patients, poor individuals. I 
didn’t have a lot of African American people who 
would tell me they used it, but I expect you 
would hear that from some the other council 
members.“ 
The socio- 
economically 
disadvantaged 
・concrete 
benefits from 
LITV use 
A middle-aged 
white female 
with only 
elementary 
education 
attainment and 
limited prior 
computer 
exposure  
 
“I had two open heart surgeries and a stroke. I 
did go in there and checked out medicines. If 
there are things I don’t understand, I would go 
on site and seek knowledge. It did make me feel 
better about things. As we got more familiar and 
used to it being there and around, we used it 
more and more. It’s like, ‘yeah, we are going to 
Internet’, you know… And then I realized, hey, I 
can go on the Internet (laughs quite happily).” 
The socio- 
economically 
disadvantaged 
・concrete 
benefits from 
LITV use 
A middle-aged 
black female 
with high school 
diploma without 
computer 
experience 
“The WorldGate Internet has helped me very 
much. I now use a computer at work and I am 
thankful for experience I received by the Internet 
TV. It was great the city did this for us. I am 
seeing lots of adults feel like I do. Some of my 
friends use it all the time.” 
The socio- 
economically 
disadvantaged 
・concrete 
benefits from 
LITV use 
Quotes from 
council member 
Bobby Traylor 
“Because of the use, because it has been able 
to bridge the digital divide, the elderly that’s 
never seen a computer are now communicating 
with their children and grandchildren in cities in 
or out of state where the children and 
grandchildren live, and the grandchildren with a 
low-income, that probably would have never 
touched the computer until they reached the 
level in school to which computers were offered, 
whether they (were in) sixth grade. I don’t know 
what particular grade that the computers are 
now being introduced into the school level. So, 
we’re bringing all kids of low-income, 
middle-income … out there that don’t have 
access to a computer.”  
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The socio- 
economically 
disadvantaged 
・everyone 
should use 
LITV 
A senior white 
male resident  
“The Internet TV is very important to me. I find it 
most useful and helpful. My wife and I are the 
only ones at this address. I am the only one who 
actively operates the equipment. However, it is 
not unusual for her to ask me to use the 
equipment for some purpose she has in mind, so 
both of us profit from it. I think the city did a great 
deed when they decided to furnish this service. 
And I hope they will continue to do so. I think the 
Internet is easy to use and I think everyone 
should use it. I intend to use it myself as long as 
I am able. I use it frequently. 
The socio- 
economically 
disadvantaged 
・everyone 
should use 
LITV 
Quotes from 
council member 
Willie 
Edmonson who 
represented 
part of the 
African 
American 
community in  
LaGrange 
“I would love to see everyone [use it], the 
children especially. They should have our 
children on it working on that thing constantly. 
Doing homework, emailing one another, asking 
one another about their homework, and things of 
that nature. I think, again I think that school 
systems, it should be some teacher in the 
classroom that should say, ‘Look I’m going to 
take advantage of this because, each one of my 
students, I can email their parents. I can tell 
each one of my students that their homework 
assignment if they forget about it, it will be on the 
computer and it will be on the website whatever. 
I’ll put it out there so you can find it’”. 
The socio- 
economically 
advantaged 
・an inferior 
technology to 
me 
A senior male 
with college 
degree &  
PC experience 
“Without a printer, scanner or a CD drive, the 
WorldGate system is of no value to me.” 
 
The socio- 
economically 
advantaged 
・an inferior 
technology to 
me 
A white male 
with annual 
household 
income > 75K 
“LITV is a ‘Mickey Mouse’ way to access the 
Internet.” 
The socio- 
economically 
advantaged 
・an inferior 
technology to 
me 
A female with a 
doctoral degree 
and annual 
household > 
100K 
“The problem is that web pages aren’t designed 
to be rendered on a TV with its low resolution. 
Therefore graphics don’t render well and too 
much horizontal and vertical scrolling is required 
to view a page. It’s awful! I guess if you can’t 
afford any other access, it’s better than nothing. 
Otherwise, it’s frankly pathetic.” 
 
The socio- 
economically 
advantaged 
・an inferior 
technology to 
me 
・good 
intention, bad 
execution 
 
A white female 
in her 30’s with 
a postgraduate 
degree and 
annual income 
> 100K  
“I ultimately became frustrated when the service 
never seemed to work, and haven’t bothered 
trying to see what’s going on at this point 
because I use my computer … Basically, I think 
the city’s intentions are admirable, but the 
execution leaves a lot to be desired. Also, I have 
not had the sense that the service reached the 
people for whom it is intended – i.e., those who 
would go without service unless it is provided 
free. We never needed the service to have 
Internet access.” 
41 
 
The socio- 
economically 
advantaged 
・an inferior 
technology to 
me 
 
 
A middle-aged 
white female 
from the 
wealthiest 
neighborhood in 
LaGrange. 
“I got the Internet TV to let my children 
experience the Internet because I was usually 
on my computer and they couldn’t use it. 
However, the Internet TV was a let down to the 
whole family, my 8 year old said it was too slow 
and links were not "found" many times. The 
transfer between TV and Internet was so 
frustrating to my 10 year old, he disconnected it 
one day and said he'd just wait to use the 
computer. I also found some pictures would not 
show on the Internet TV that did show on the 
computer and that was frustrating … My opinion 
would be if it is really free, it may be good for 
people who can't afford a computer — but if they 
have ever used a computer for the Internet it 
may drive them crazy.” 
The socio- 
economically 
advantaged 
・good 
intention, bad 
execution 
A white male in 
his 50’s with a 
college degree 
and sufficient 
PC experience 
“This whole Internet TV was a show for the city 
of LaGrange and our mayor. It makes our town 
look good but in realty it was all a lot of 
BULLxxxx. I wonder who is looking [at] the bill.” 
* The socioeconomically disadvantaged and advantaged shared this attitude. 
